United Nations A/59/156

General Assembly

Distr.: General
14 July 2004
English
Original: Arabic/Chinese/English/
Spanish

Fifty-ninth session
Item 67 (r) of the preliminary list*
General and complete disarmament

Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

Report of the Secretary-General

Contents

		Page
I.	Introduction	3
II.	Replies received from Member States	3
	Argentina	3
	China	5
	Costa Rica	6
	Georgia	6
	Lebanon	8
	Panama	8
III.	Replies received from international organizations	9
	Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean	9
	International Atomic Energy Agency	9
	International Civil Aviation Organization	13
	International Criminal Police Organization	14
	International Maritime Organization	15
	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons	17

* A/59/50 and Corr.1.

04-43236 (E) 120804

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 18
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization 22
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 22
World Customs Organization 23

I. Introduction

1. In paragraph 2 of its resolution 58/48 of 8 December 2003, entitled "Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction", the General Assembly urged all Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture, and invited them to inform the Secretary-General, on a voluntary basis, of the measures taken in that regard. In paragraph 4 of the same resolution, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures already taken by international organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, to seek the views of Member States on additional relevant measures for tackling the global threat posed by the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction, and to report to the General Assembly at its fifty-ninth session. The present report is submitted in response to that request.

2. By a note verbale dated 27 February 2004, Member States were invited to inform the Secretary-General on the measures taken, as well as to communicate their views on the issue. On 19 March, letters were also dispatched to relevant international organizations, including relevant bodies and agencies of the United Nations, inviting them to submit contributions for the preparation of the report of the Secretary-General. In this connection, organizations that had reported their relevant activities in 2003 were invited to submit only new information in relation to what they had previously submitted. Replies have been received from Argentina, China, Costa Rica, Georgia, Lebanon and Panama, as well as from 10 international organizations. Their replies are reproduced in sections II and III, respectively, of the present report. Any replies received subsequently will be issued as addenda to the present report.

3. For its part, the United Nations has remained engaged in matters relating to the dangers of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists. On 28 April, the Security Council adopted resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

II. Replies received from Member States

Argentina

[Original: Spanish]
[14 May 2004]

The Government of the Argentine Republic welcomes the decision of the United Nations Security Council to play an active role in combating the threat posed by the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by non-State actors. Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) of 28 April 2004 is a major step towards ensuring international peace and security.

At the same time, it reinforces an integral approach to the problem, building on the actions undertaken in 2001 with the adoption of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) and the establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Committee under the

auspices of the Security Council. In accordance with paragraphs 3 (c) and 4 of that resolution, the Government of the Argentine Republic reported on the international instruments, legislation and procedures in force for the exchange of information and for ensuring the coordination of efforts on national, subregional, regional and international levels in combating this threat.

In this regard, the Argentine Republic, as a State which does not possess weapons of mass destruction, has adopted a number of measures to regulate the transfer of materials which may be used for the manufacture of such weapons, thereby preventing their diversion towards non-State actors.

Argentina is a party to the following international instruments regulating the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons: the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Biological Weapons Convention. It has also ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Argentina also participates in the following export control regimes: the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Australia Group (chemical and biological material).

The provisions, guidelines and criteria approved in these international instruments have been incorporated at the domestic level through decree No. 603/92 and additional provisions controlling transfers of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological and missile material, equipment, technologies, technical assistance and/or services. The decree also establishes the national commission for the control of sensitive exports and war materiel, consisting of the various State agencies and technical bodies concerned with the regulation of the materials in question.

The commission has the power to grant export licences, import certificates and delivery confirmation certificates. Export applications are analysed on a case-by-case basis and the decision reached on them takes into account Argentina's firm commitment to non-proliferation and the international circumstances (domestic and regional contexts) of the country to which such materials are destined. For example, in the case of authorizations for the export of nuclear material, such as reactors, enriched uranium or related technology, a bilateral agreement on nuclear cooperation for peaceful purposes is required, or adherence by the country in question to the nuclear exports control regimes in which the Argentine Republic participates. The country of destination is also required to have a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Argentine Government firmly believes that export control regimes, along with the universalization of the international disarmament instruments, are the first step towards preventing the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups. For that reason, our country would be gratified if the international community were able to achieve the universalization of such systems, in order to coordinate responses to this growing threat.

China

[Original: Chinese]
[24 May 2004]

Measures taken by China to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture

The Government of China opposes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, opposes terrorism in all forms, and supports international cooperation against proliferation and terrorism.

The Government of China strictly fulfils its relevant international obligations and commitments, and is continuously strengthening its domestic regulation of sensitive items and technologies. It has established a comprehensive and effective system of export control legislation with a view to implementing strict and efficient controls on the export of items and technologies associated with weapons of mass destruction, thereby effectively preventing the proliferation of such items and technologies.

In order to implement a strict system of examination and approval of related items and technologies, the Government of China has promulgated and put into effect the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Control of Nuclear Export, the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Nuclear Goods and Related Technologies, the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Dual-Use Biological Agents and Related Equipment and Technologies, the Regulations of the PRC on Monitored and Controlled Chemicals, the Measures on Export Control of Certain Chemicals and Related Equipment and Technologies, and the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Export Control of Missiles and Missile-related Items and Technologies along with the corresponding control lists, and imposes severe punitive measures when violations occur.

In December of 2003, the Chinese Government published a White Paper on "China's Non-Proliferation Policy and Measures", which comprehensively introduced the effort China is undertaking in the area of non-proliferation.

The Chinese Government strictly observes its obligations under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, and actively participates in the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The Chinese Government supports the efforts of the IAEA to prevent potential nuclear terrorism, actively participates in the revision of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and strictly observes the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources.

In December 2001, the Chinese Government submitted a report on its implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) to the Counter-

Terrorism Committee, and submitted a supplementary report on that topic in January 2002. These two reports provided an introduction to the measures being taken by the Chinese Government to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

The Chinese Government is of the view that strengthening countries' non-proliferation legislative frameworks, export controls and material protection regimes will aid in preventing terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. To this end, China supports the strengthening of international mechanisms and multilateral cooperation.

Costa Rica

[Original: Spanish]
[11 May 2004]

Costa Rica has an Arms and Explosives Act of 10 July 1995 (act No. 7530), which has been amended three times, on 17 December 1999 (act No. 7957), 1 November 2000 (act No. 8042) and 18 December 2001 (act No. 8251), the last-mentioned act being the most relevant to the matter before us.[1]

The Criminal Code of Costa Rica (act No. 4573), in title IX "Offences against public security", section I "Arson and other destruction", provides for the offences of "Arson or explosion", "Destruction", "Failure to ensure disaster prevention", "Criminal disasters" and, lastly, "Manufacture or possession of explosive materials", which is the most relevant for the issue at hand, and states the following:

> "Article 248: Anyone who, in order to assist in the perpetration of offences, manufactures, supplies, acquires, steals or possesses bombs or explosive, flammable, asphyxiating or toxic materials, or substances or materials intended for their preparation, shall incur a penalty of four to eight years' imprisonment.
>
> The same penalty shall apply to anyone who is aware or should be aware that he is assisting in the perpetration of offences and gives instructions for the preparation of substances or materials referred to in the preceding paragraph. Anyone who has in his possession the materials indicated in the first paragraph of this article, for purposes other than those indicated, and without authorization from the appropriate authorities, shall be imprisoned for two to four years" (Criminal Code of Costa Rica).

Georgia

[Original: English]
[18 May 2004]

In accordance with General Assembly resolution 58/48, the following legislative acts related to the problem of export control and non-proliferation were adopted:

[1] This document was attached to the reply received from Costa Rica and is available for consultation at the Department for Disarmament Affairs.

- The main legislative act in the field of export control, "The law on export control of arms, military equipment and dual use products" was adopted by the Parliament on 28 April 1998;

- On 15 October 1997 Presidential Decree No. 582 was issued, according to which the Permanent Inter-agency Commission on Military-Technical Issues of the National Security Council was established for coordination of military-technical cooperation with foreign countries and regulation of export-import issues of sole military use products. The Decree also implied the adoption of three statutes: "Statute of the national security council permanent interagency commission on military-technical issues", "Statute on licensing regulations for the export-import of sole military use products, technical documentation, activities and services" and the "Statute on regulation of military-technical cooperation with foreign countries". The "Statute on licensing regulations for the export-import of sole military use products, technical documentation, activities and services" together with Presidential Decree No. 103 were adopted on 13 March 1999. It nominated the Ministry of Justice as the agency responsible for issuing licences on export, transit, re-export and import of arms on the basis of the recommendations of the Permanent Inter-agency Commission of the National Security Council on Military-Technical Issues;

- On 7 December 1999, Presidential Decree No. 650 "On some measures of regulation of export-import of military armament, equipment and ammunition" was adopted;

- On 15 July 2000, Presidential Decree No. 304 regarding the list of military use products under export control was adopted.

The Permanent Inter-agency Commission of the National Security Council on Military Technical Issues has been created and the Secretary of the National Security Council was appointed as a chairman of this Commission. It consists of the heads of the agencies concerned, the directors of defence plants and representatives of State and public organizations.

An export licence may be issued on the basis of a recommendation of the Permanent Interagency Commission on Military-Technical Issues, taking into consideration the following criteria:

- The signed contract or concluded protocol of intentions;

- Permission to carry out export issued by the authorized State bodies of the country in the territory of which the party to the contract or to the protocol of intentions is registered;

- Original of the end-user certificate issued by a department interested in import.

Presentation of the end-user certificate is a precondition for obtaining the export licence. The export contract must cover the obligation of the receiving State to use the goods imported from Georgia only for the needs of the country and not to re-export or transfer goods to a third party without the consent of Georgia.

Export transactions are not carried out to countries on which relevant sanctions have been imposed by the United Nations or other international organizations or in compliance with the legislation of Georgia.

The legislation of Georgia determines transit as the movement of goods under customs control in the customs territory of the country.

Lebanon

[Original: Arabic]
[14 May 2004]

The Lebanese State does not possess weapons of mass destruction and is in compliance with the United Nations resolutions prohibiting the use of such weapons for terrorist purposes. Lebanese law does not permit the harbouring of terrorists. Lebanon participates with the international community in the fight against terrorism, but is beset by anxiety over the existence of links between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, especially since such weapons are available to Israeli terrorism.

Panama

[Original: Spanish]
[15 July 2004]

The instruments which have been adopted include:

- Executive decree No. 77 of 5 June 2003 amending decree No. 125 of 27 March 1995, as amended by decrees No. 64 of 17 March 2000 and No. 26 of 2 March 2001, which establishes, and designates the members of, the high-level presidential commission against the laundering of the proceeds of drug trafficking, and lays down further provisions;
- Executive decree No. 78 of 5 June 2003 amending decree No. 163 of 3 October 2000 establishing the financial analysis unit for the prevention of the laundering of assets and the financing of terrorism;
- Act No. 48 of 26 June 2003 regulating the operations of money transfer bureaux in order to prevent the laundering of assets and the financing of international terrorism;
- Act No. 75 of 3 December 2003 approving the Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, adopted in Bridgetown, Barbados, on 3 June 2002;
- Direct enforcement of act No. 16 of 27 May 1999 approving the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials, signed in Washington, D.C. on 14 November 1997.

Furthermore, some draft laws have been formulated and are currently under consideration, including the draft law on arms setting forth general provisions concerning the import, transit, purchase and sale of weapons, ammunition and components in the Republic of Panama, and the appropriate permits for their legitimate bearing, use and possession. A draft law is also under consideration regulating the import, export, re-export, trans-shipment and transit of dual-use materials, substances, waste and products, technology and logistical support in order to prevent their diversion for illicit purposes or in violation of international law and establishing the national committee on safe trade.

III. Replies received from international organizations

Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean

[Original: English]
[10 May 2004]

With regard to the "... measures already taken by international organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" (operative para. 4), the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean draws attention to resolution CG/Res.457 "Havana Declaration", adopted during the XVIII regular session of the General Conference held in Havana on 5 November 2003.[2]

International Atomic Energy Agency

[Original: English]
[19 May 2004]

Further to information provided by the International Atomic Energy Agency in 2003[3] in response to resolution 57/83, the following additional information has been submitted. The presentation of the information follows the format of the 2003 submission.

Activity areas

I. Physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities

1. To further enhance their capacity to protect nuclear facilities against nuclear terrorism, member States have requested guidance on how to initiate and establish security arrangements at nuclear installations. Work continues on conceptual approaches related to sabotage against nuclear facilities and protection against an "insider" threat. In particular, an overview document on protection against sabotage, self-assessment guidelines and facility walk-down procedures has been prepared. Security and safety aspects of sabotage have been considered as complementary in these documents. Work has also started to identify a methodology to strengthen information technology security at nuclear installations as a part of sabotage protection.

2. The Agency continues to implement an extensive programme of physical protection-related training, workshops and seminars relating to physical protection, directed at international, regional and national audiences. Since September 2001, 56 training courses have been held, and regional training courses have taken place in Australia, the Czech Republic, India, Mexico and Russia. Further regional training courses are being planned for 2004, to take place in Australia, Brazil, China, Czech Republic, India, Namibia, Russian and South Africa. International training courses on physical protection and on general nuclear security issues have taken place in the United States and will again be held there in 2004.

[2] A/58/622.

[3] See A/58/208, chap. III.

II. Detection of malicious activities involving nuclear and other radioactive materials

3. The detection of attempts to smuggle nuclear and other radioactive materials at border crossings remains important. As part of the International Nuclear Security Advisory Service, which is aimed at identifying needs for additional or improved security for the nuclear-related activities on a State-wide basis, the Agency has assessed present capabilities to detect and respond to illicit nuclear trafficking across border. Expert teams have worked with host country counterparts to identify requirements for improved detection capability and to identify the assistance needed to establish and sustain this improved capability.

4. The Agency continued to support customs and other front-line officers in their familiarization with detection instruments. The participants in workshops held by the Agency have benefited from hands-on practice with instruments and the application of new knowledge through in-field exercises.

5. In response to concerns raised by several African States, an illicit trafficking awareness seminar is being planned for December 2004, to be held either in the United Republic of Tanzania or in Kenya. Such a seminar will provide the foundations for determining subsequent nuclear security assistance. In addition, nuclear security missions to five States that have requested such assistance are also anticipated. The Agency maintained an illicit trafficking database. A meeting with the points of contact for the illicit trafficking database, convened in October 2003, resulted in recommendations to continue the improvement of the database, including enhanced reporting by States and further strengthening of the analysis and evaluation of the content, operations and scope of the database. A new format of the annual summary report on illicit trafficking was distributed to member States and international organizations.

III. State systems for nuclear material accountancy and control

6. A new initiative, designed to provide assistance to national competent authorities by way of recommendations for improvements on the state systems for nuclear material accountancy and control (SSAC), is the International SSAC Advisory Service. Necessary improvements to the accountability of nuclear materials at facilities may also be identified through these missions. These missions may result in statements of good practices or recommendations for upgrades, which in turn provide the basis for subsequent assistance for improvements.

7. In support of more effective state systems, the Agency has provided and installed computer hardware and software systems in three member States.

8. In addition, seven SSAC-related training events were conducted for member States in 2003.

IV. Security of radioactive material other than nuclear material

9. Work in this area can be broadly grouped into two sub-areas: *retrospective* — remediation of an existing situation with regard to orphan or vulnerable radioactive sources; and *prospective* — efforts to prevent other sources from becoming orphaned or vulnerable.

Retrospective

10. The focus of retrospective efforts is on the development of national strategies for regaining control over radioactive sources. In 2003, 10 national strategy missions and 3 national strategy workshops were held, and more are being planned for 2004.

11. The Agency has initiated a Nuclear Security series of documents to provide a coherent and integral framework for documents related to nuclear security. It will be used to reach a broader audience and will emphasize security of nuclear material and other radioactive material in use, storage and transport, as well as the security of nuclear installations.

12. A technical document related to security of transport of radioactive materials has been prepared, in consultation with experts from member States, for interim guidance and comments.

Prospective

13. A technical document on preparedness and response for malevolent acts involving radioactive material is being prepared. The work includes a planning methodology and, where appropriate, tools to assist national authorities in making arrangements for response to such incidents and potential radiological emergencies that may be the result of malicious acts.

14. One major focus of preventative efforts is on the development of an international undertaking, based on the "Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources". A draft of the revised Code of Conduct was distributed to member States for comments by 1 June 2003. A meeting to review and incorporate these comments was held in July 2003 and, subsequently, the Code of Conduct was approved by the Board of Governors in September 2003.

15. A second major focus of the preventative work is the development of guidance on the security of radioactive sources. A meeting of representatives from the major manufacturing and distributing countries was held in Vienna in late April 2003 to address issues related to design of sources, validation of legal purchases and return of sources as well as consideration of export controls. An interim document was completed and published in June 2003.

16. In 2004-2005 the Agency plans to hold an international symposium on the safety and security of radiation sources, to develop specific practice training modules for the major radiation sources and to establish a qualified pool of trainers for courses on the above topics.

V. Assessment of safety/security-related vulnerability of nuclear facilities

(reflected in Section I)

VI. Response to malicious acts, or threats thereof

17. The Agency has intensified its efforts to strengthen response measures in member States. A pilot course on combating both nuclear terrorism and incidents involving illicit trafficking in nuclear materials was held in Romania for a regional audience. The course focused on responding to terrorist acts, including related aspects of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials.

18. Work has continued on a technical document on preparedness and response for malevolent acts involving radioactive material. Training material based on the draft technical document was piloted in workshops during 2003. The document and material will be revisited in 2004, with the aim of publishing the material for subsequent widespread use.

19. Further to its efforts in strengthening its emergency response arrangements, throughout 2004-2005, the Agency will develop and maintain the in-house plan and procedures for emergency response, including response to emergencies involving malicious use of radioactive substances. Work will also take place to enhance the capabilities of IAEA field teams to be sent in response to requests for emergency assistance, including response to emergencies involving malicious use of radioactive substances.

VII. Nuclear security coordination and information management

20. To strengthen coordination of Agency nuclear security activities with those conducted through bilateral support programmes, the IAEA convened a meeting in December 2003, involving States providing voluntary contributions to the Agency's nuclear security programme, some of which also have bilateral support programmes. The meeting resulted in a number of recommendations to improve interaction and to enhance coordination, and recognize that strengthening nuclear security requires the effective use of resources to avoid duplication of efforts and to enhance the impact of individual contributions towards the same goal.

21. The existing illicit trafficking database continues to grow. In total, the database contains information on 576 confirmed cases of illicit trafficking, as of April 2004. In 2003, States confirmed 75 incidents, 60 of which had occurred in 2003 and 15 of which had taken place prior to 2003. In 2004, 29 incidents had occurred as of April. Efforts continue to encourage more member States to become database participants. The number of member States participating in the database has increased to 75. Coverage in the database of incidents involving radioactive sources is improving but remains less comprehensive than that for nuclear material.

22. The Agency continues to seek collaboration and coordination with other international organizations including, but not limited to, the Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol), the World Customs Organization, Europol, the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament and the Universal Postal Union. It has also given numerous briefings to groups of government representatives in Geneva, New York and elsewhere. The Inter-Agency Coordination Committee on Illicit Cross-Border Movements of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Materials, in which a variety of international organizations participate, met in May 2003. The Agency has also actively participated in the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute and Europol round table addressing the strengthening of international cooperation to combat trafficking in weapons of mass destruction and the international permanent observatory on security measures during major events. Starting with a series of informal briefings, which were initiated in September 2003, the Agency and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are in the process of identifying areas of activity that offer scope for cooperation and mutual support. Some information exchange mechanisms have already been put in

place. Measures are currently under way to broaden and deepen the scope of the existing cooperation with Interpol.

International Civil Aviation Organization

[Original: English]
[7 June 2004]

The International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) activities are focused on preventing acts of unlawful interference to civil aviation and the organization has no specific measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. However, there are some ICAO activities that may be of interest. Such activities include:

1. Pursuant to the High-level Ministerial Conference on Aviation Security, held in Montreal in February 2002, the Council of ICAO established an ICAO Universal Security Audit Programme relating to, inter alia, airport security arrangements and civil aviation security programmes with a view to assessing the level of implementation by States of security-related standards. The objective of the audit programme is to further enhance aviation security by identifying deficiencies in each State and providing suitable recommendations for their resolution. As of 28 May 2004, 36 States have been audited by ICAO aviation security audit teams.

2. The threat posed to civil aviation by terrorist and other unauthorized use of man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) presents an enormous challenge to aviation security practitioners and ICAO accords the highest priority to the work on this subject, including cooperation with all partners involved. In this regard, the Council of ICAO has recently considered the threat in a broader context and agreed that technical preventive measures would have to be developed and coordinated with the appropriate United Nations bodies. These measures should be implemented globally and not unilaterally, since the threat posed by such man-portable systems is a global one. With reference to the export control of such man-portable systems, the Council agreed to encourage the implementation of the principles of the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-use Goods and Technologies, Elements for Export Controls of MANPADS (Vienna, December 2003). The Council also decided that existing Assembly resolution A32-23: MANPADS Export Control is no longer adequate and a new draft resolution will be presented to the forthcoming thirty-fifth session of the Assembly (28 September to 8 October 2004).

3. The twelfth session of the Facilitation Division of ICAO, held in Cairo from 22 March to 1 April 2004, under the theme of "Managing Security Challenges to Facilitate Air Transport" recommended various measures to reduce airport congestion and increase aviation security. A key recommendation calls for ICAO member States to begin issuing machine-readable passports no later than 2010, in accordance with ICAO specifications. States will be consulted regarding this recommendation in the light of which the ICAO Council will take the appropriate decision. Actually more than 100 States are issuing machine-readable passports. The session also recommended that States incorporate biometrics for further strengthening their travel documents. Other recommendations include a standardized approach to advance passenger information systems conforming to guidelines jointly maintained by ICAO, the World Customs Organization and the International Air

Transport Association and a harmonized approach to passenger name record access developed under the auspices of ICAO.

International Criminal Police Organization

[Original: English]
[26 May 2004]

Currently, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) has two ongoing projects which are strong measures to address the issue of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction. Listed below is detailed information regarding the projects.

Geiger

Project Geiger involves the collection and analysis of all known data from law enforcement and non-law enforcement sources, involving the theft of radiological material, with the goal of identifying trends and methods of theft and the potential vulnerability to future theft by terrorists in the construction of a "dirty bomb". The analytical results will be used by the United States Department of Energy, the IAEA, the World Customs Organization and Interpol to work with member States to secure existing material, help strengthen law enforcement capabilities to interdict future thefts and to provide appropriate training.

Our objectives for this project are to:

- Develop trend analysis to inform member States of problems within their country;
- Identify routes of transport to enhance interdiction;
- Provide training to member States as requested;
- Identify potential sources of nuclear material that may be vulnerable to terrorists interested in obtaining the material.

Cooperative Radiological Instrument Transfer

The overall goal of the Cooperative Radiological Instrument Transfer project is to provide front-line law enforcement officers with the necessary equipment and training to detect and mitigate radiological security threats, and to remain competent in the use of this equipment over an extended period of time. This includes the development and implementation of a long-term strategy to provide equipment, associated training, and as appropriate, maintenance of this radiation detection equipment. In cooperation with the United States Department of Energy, Interpol will be providing member countries law enforcement organizations transfer of surplus Department of Energy radiation detection instrumentation. In addition to the transfer of equipment, the project will develop and deliver training and radiological threat reduction-based exercises to the front-line officers who will be using the radiation detection equipment.

International Maritime Organization

[Original: English]
[10 May 2004]

Guidance material

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has developed further resolutions and guidance circulars with security applications. These include: Guidance on provision of ship security alter systems (2003); Directives for maritime rescue coordination centres on acts of violence against ships (2003); Interim guidelines for the authorization of recognized security organizations acting on behalf of the Administration and/or Designated Authority of a Contracting Government (2003); and Guidance relating to the implementation of the Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea chapter XI-2 and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (2003).

A number of circulars and circular letters urging Contracting Governments to take full and early action to implement the maritime security provisions of Convention chapter XI-2 and the Code have also been issued. Contracting Governments' compliance with Convention chapter XI-2 and the Code are monitored by IMO in the run up to the 1 July 2004 implementation date. Convention regulation XI-2/13 requires, inter alia, Contracting Governments to communicate information on compliance and maritime security-related points of contact to IMO, for dissemination to other Contracting Governments. This information is promulgated via the Global Integrated Shipping Information System database on the IMO public web site, www.imo.org.

Review of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation

The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation and the Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf were adopted by an international conference convened by IMO in Rome in March 1988. As at 31 March 2004, they had 104 and 95 Contracting Parties, respectively. The IMO Legal Committee, at its meeting in April 2004, continued its consideration of the need to widen the scope of the Convention to include additional offences relating to the carriage of weapons of mass destruction and precursors. This work is ongoing.

Cooperation with the International Labour Organization

Following close cooperation with IMO, the International Labour Organization (ILO) adopted the Seafarers' Identity Documents (Revised) Convention (No. 185) in June 2003. This replaced ILO Convention 108 — Seafarers' Identity Documents Convention.

A joint ILO/IMO Code of Practice on security in ports, which was adopted by the Governing Body of the ILO in March 2004 and is expected to be adopted by the IMO Maritime Safety Committee in May 2004, has also been developed.

Cooperation with the World Customs Organization

IMO continues to cooperate with the World Customs Organization (WCO) to develop measures to enhance security in the multimodal movement of cargo transport units.

Actions by the International Maritime Organization secretariat

Since the adoption of the Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea chapter XI-2 and the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code in December 2002, IMO has continued to raise awareness of maritime security threats and of the regulatory measures that need to be developed by Contracting Governments. Training materials have been updated twice in order to place more emphasis on practical approaches to implementation of the new regulatory regime, with particular attention on the preparation of port facility security assessments and plans. Furthermore, to provide a dedicated source of financial support for the maritime security technical cooperation activities and, in particular, for national initiatives in the developing regions, a Maritime Security Trust Fund has been established. In addition, IMO has developed and published model courses for ship security officers, company security officers and port facility security officers.

To date, IMO has delivered or supported 19 advisory and needs-assessment missions, as well as high-level briefings at national level, and has organized 18 regional and subregional and 35 national seminars/workshops covering all developing regions. To date, 2,691 personnel from maritime administrations, shipping companies, ports and industry and regional organizations have been trained.

IMO is currently in the process of commissioning the production of a training package, which will incorporate relevant elements of the Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea amendments, the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code, the IMO model course for port facility security officers (No. 3.21) and the ILO/IMO Code of practice on security in ports. The training package is likely to incorporate a CD-ROM containing video clips, written materials and interactive, web-based links.

To further enhance the existing programme for maritime and port security, IMO is also developing a related "train-the-trainer" programme. The objective is to assist Governments to strengthen regulatory implementation by enlarging the pool of trained instructors capable of delivering high-quality maritime security training at the national and regional levels, using IMO's updated training package and its three model courses for security officers. The programme will seek to identify potential instructors from member States and the industry, who, following initial training through IMO, can return to their countries and regions and train other instructors.

IMO staff have also continued to participate in a wide range of seminars, exhibitions, conferences and workshops promoting maritime security.

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

[Original: English]
[4 May 2004]

The role of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the fight against terrorism derives from the decision (EC-27/DEC.5), taken by the Executive Council on 7 December 2001. The decision entitled "The OPCW's contribution to global anti-terrorist efforts" in its operative paragraph 1 states that "the full and effective implementation of all provisions of the Convention [Chemical Weapons Convention] is in itself a contribution to global anti-terrorist efforts". The decision identifies the five core implementation areas, which significantly contribute to the global counter-terrorism activities. The areas are related to the promotion of universal adherence to the Convention, criminalization of Convention-related violations on a national level, destruction of chemical weapons, inspections of the chemical industry and the ability of the Organisation to provide the assistance in case of use or threat of use of chemical weapons.

The OPCW Executive Council on 21 March 2002 took a decision (EC-28/DEC.5) on "National implementation measures", focusing on improving national implementation of the Convention of the key areas where the fulfilment of their obligations under the Convention by States constituted a significant contribution to counter-terrorism.

The Organisation's role in respect to providing assurances for the non-proliferation of chemical weapons flows directly from the core provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention by obliging its State parties to never under any circumstances use, develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer directly or indirectly chemical weapons to anyone.

Furthermore, the First Special Session of the Conference of the States Parties to conduct a review of the operation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (First Review Conference), held from 29 April to 9 May 2003, once again recognized the link between non-proliferation measures under the Convention and counter-terrorism.

Current activities of the Organisation directly follow the decisions and recommendations of the First Review Conference and include the following:

- The implementation of an OPCW action plan on the universality of the Convention
- The implementation of an OPCW action plan on the implementation of Article VII obligations (This would require all State parties to make it a crime for anyone, anywhere to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain toxic chemicals, or transfer, directly or indirectly to anyone, and to enforce such laws and adopt related administrative regulations, which would help deter any individual, group, or government from doing so and ensure that those who violate the Convention are punished).
- A project to assist interested State parties in the identification of declarable activities and facilities under Article VI of the Convention for industrial verification (project relates to the open source research of undeclared industry facilities)

- The establishment of a network of legal experts to facilitate the development and enactment of CWC implementing legislation, including penal legislation, by all State parties as required by the Convention
- The further development of the Organisation's concept of the delivery of assistance if chemical weapons were used against a State party, as well as of its programme to provide expert advice upon request to State parties wishing to enhance their protective capacity against chemical weapons
- The optimization of the Convention verification system in general, with particular emphasis on chemical weapons destruction verification

In addition, the First Review Conference noted that the OPCW can be a forum for consultation and cooperation among State parties with respect to the security of chemical weapons stockpiles, as well as with respect to measures to protect the security of chemical facilities against conventional attacks including by non-State actors, highlighting the responsibilities of the State party concerned to take the necessary measures to provide such security.

Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

[Original: English]
[5 April 2004]

Summary

This document is an update to the report on "Anti-terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction — measures taken by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe" (SEC.GAL/148/03) submitted to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs in 2003.[4] It describes recent measures taken by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to prevent terrorists from acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction and related activities, including an emerging focus on border-related issues.

Border security management is instrumental in disrupting such transnational terrorist activities. Effective policing also can mitigate the threat of terrorist attacks using weapons of mass destruction. International cooperation and wide-ranging exchange of information enhance effectiveness of counter-terrorism measures on both fronts. While the OSCE is not engaged in efforts focused exclusively on weapons of mass destruction, its capacity-building activities support technical assistance provided by other organizations that is more weapons of mass destruction-specific. Towards this end, the OSCE is enhancing its cooperation with other international, regional and subregional organizations.

1. New and additional OSCE references

- Decision No. 3, The Annual Security Review Conference (MC(10).DEC/3), Porto 2002
- The OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-first Century (MC(11).JOUR/2), Maastricht 2002

[4] See document A/58/208/Add.1.

- Project Document — International Conference on the Emergency Preparedness for and Response to Environmental Security Risks in the Central Asian Region, 31 October 2003

2. Situation assessment

The OSCE has multiple political forums for assessing security situations within its region, including counter-terrorism and issues relating to weapons of mass destruction. The role and the decisions of these forums, inter alia the Ministerial Councils and Summits, the Permanent Council and the Forum for Security Cooperation, were already described in the original report to the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs.

In addition to previous work, the OSCE held the first Annual Security Review Conference in 2003 to provide a framework for enhancing security dialogue and for reviewing security work undertaken by the OSCE. The forum will reconvene in 2004, focusing on both the counter-terrorism and border security and management in separate sessions. The keynote speakers, tentatively the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator of the European Union, will address current and emerging terrorist threats.

3. Border security management

Strengthening border security and management capabilities in the OSCE region are complementary to preventing terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction since often trafficking in various types of illegal goods and persons utilizes the same existing criminal networks. Overall, the OSCE has identified border security as one of its four strategic anti-terrorism priorities. Consequently, the Organization has continued its activities at various levels, including technical assistance to border policing enhancing travel document security, border monitoring, facilitating cross-border cooperation, border guards and customs officials training, anti-trafficking, customs reform and border service reform.

In 2003, the OSCE Ministerial Council agreed on an OSCE Strategy to address threats to security and stability in the twenty-first century. In particular, paragraph 35 states that

> "*Threats of terrorism and organized crime are often interlinked, and synergetic approaches to deal with them will be further explored. Cross-border movement of persons, resources and weapons as well as trafficking for the purpose of financing and providing logistic support play an increasing role for terrorist activities. The OSCE is committed to addressing these problems and to strengthening its capacities to promote open and secure borders, inter alia, through the elaboration of an OSCE Border Security and Management Concept in order to enhance capacity building and mutually beneficial inter-State cooperation*".

In response to this task, a working group on borders has been convened in order to elaborate this Strategy. In addition, a borders sub-unit has been set up in the OSCE secretariat, with a mandate to act as a focal point for all border security and management-related issues. Also, a joint OSCE-United Nations conference on border-related security issues will be convened in fall 2004.

In addition, as a commitment to the Way Forward Document of the May 2003 Ohrid Agreement, the OSCE has developed the OSCE South-eastern Europe Cross-Border Cooperation Programme. This programme involves full ownership by the States of the region, and is designed to address immediate problems of cross-border cooperation, with particular attention paid to the state of agreements, or lack of them, between the countries. In addition, the question of transitioning border forces from military to civilian-led police forces, including the necessary training, will also be addressed.

4. Policing

While OSCE police assistance programme activities do not contain specific weapons of mass destruction components, they are instrumental to further progress in this field. In the absence of fundamental policing capabilities, specialized training on issues relating to weapons of mass destruction cannot be conducted owing to a lack of proper foundation. Therefore, while the OSCE focuses on enhancing basic policing capacities in its region, other actors such as the International Atomic Energy Agency can successively build on this foundation and organize weapons of mass destruction-related training.

There are several units in the OSCE institutions and field operations focusing on policing. The secretariat's Strategic Police Matters Unit is carrying out a police assistance programme for Kyrgyzstan, comprised of eight technical and community projects, which is designed to help the Kyrgyz authorities to introduce advanced policing concepts and practices. In Kazakhstan, the Unit is providing technical assistance to support the Kazakh Ministry of Internal Affairs' transition to intelligence-led policing. In Armenia and Azerbaijan, memoranda of understanding have been signed with the respective Governments to launch technical and community assistance projects designed to improve longer-term police institution-building. The Unit intends to build on its track record of supporting policing in South-East Europe — in cooperation with OSCE field operations — by cooperating with the European Commission's programme of community assistance to reconstruction, democratization and stabilization. The Unit has also substantially contributed to the Ohrid Process, particularly with regard to the assessment of border-policing needs of States in South-Eastern Europe.

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo operates the Kosovo Police Service School and in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia the OSCE is training a multi-ethnic police force. Other OSCE field operations with police assistance components are located, inter alia, in Serbia-Montenegro, Croatia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Additional information about the OSCE field activities can be found on the OSCE web site at: http://www.osce.org/field_activities/

5. Enhancing international cooperation

From 11 to 12 March 2004, the OSCE hosted in cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) the follow-up conference to the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Security Council Special Meeting between international, regional and subregional organizations. While no special session was dedicated to terrorism involving weapons on mass destruction, several sessions focused on strengthening the ratification and implementation of pertinent universal anti-terrorism instruments and on enhancing border security and

management. Also, the organizations developed bilateral relations and an overall coordinative framework led by the Counter-Terrorism Committee, which will also yield benefits in preventing terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction. Additional information on this conference is available on the Action against Terrorism Unit web site: www.osce.org/atu

Both in preventing terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction and in counter-terrorism more generally, information exchange is of vital essence, including sharing situation assessments, best practices and lessons learned. Towards this end, in January 2004, the OSCE Counter-Terrorism Network was established. It aims to strengthen information-sharing on counter-terrorism programmes, funding and needs in the OSCE region, strengthen and speed information flow and contacts between delegations of participating States, counter-terrorism officials in capitals, and the Action against Terrorism Unit in the OSCE secretariat. In addition to continuing OSCE efforts to implement United Nations Security Council resolution 1373 (2001), the Network seeks to strengthen States' capacities to address current and emerging terrorist threats, including threats related to weapons of mass destruction. The Network is not a conduit for intelligence or other sensitive information, nor does it seek to duplicate the functions of other international and regional law-enforcement networks. Rather, it is a tool for counter-terrorism practitioners to share information on training and funding opportunities and needs to facilitate national capacity-building efforts. One possible way to apply it to preventing terrorist access to weapons of mass destruction is to share information about IAEA training and other assistance available in combating trafficking of nuclear and radiological substances.

Since October 2003, the OSCE has held a series of meetings with IAEA with an aim to strengthen practical cooperation. Particular focus is paid on suppressing trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials. The programme of cooperation is still being considered. However, as an example of combining comparative strengths of the organizations, the OSCE has already worked together with the IAEA to respond to requests for technical assistance from the participating States.

In Kyrgyzstan, the OSCE has been facilitating international cooperation to address the threat of a large amount of radiological material in the Mailuu-Suu site. As part of the effort, an online database has been established to address the need to centralize existing material about managing radioactive waste. More detailed information on this effort can be found on the OSCE web site at: http://www.osce.org/features/show_feature.php?id=204

The OSCE will also consider possibilities to cooperate with other organizations in a similar fashion and maintain awareness of international efforts on this front. For example, the OSCE Action against Terrorism Unit attended an inaugural meeting of the Anti-Terrorism Task Force of the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative's Regional Centre for Combating Transborder Crime in 2003, which has organized a working group on issues related to weapons of mass destruction.

Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization

[Original: English]
27 May 2004

Further to information provided by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in response to General Assembly resolution 57/83, the following additional information has been submitted.

Four new States have signed and 10 have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which stands currently with 171 signatures and 113 ratifications, including 32 of the 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty whose ratification is required for entry into force.

The global verification regime being established is already capable of detecting potential violations of the provisions of the Treaty, thus constraining attempts to carry out hidden nuclear test explosions. In this regard, it is of particular significance that States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty pursuant to article XIV, are given a key role in the entry into force and subsequent implementation of the Treaty.

On the occasion of the Conference on Facilitating Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (article XIV conference) convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which took place in Vienna from 3 to 5 September 2003, ratifying and signatory States pledged to further advance the cause of the Treaty in the context of their overall non-proliferation and disarmament policies.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

[Original: English]
[7 June 2004]

The Terrorism Prevention Branch is not currently engaged in matters that are directly related to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. However, the Branch does liaise with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), as well as with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on matters of mutual concern. For example, both organizations participated in the Follow-up Meeting to the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee meeting between international, regional and subregional organizations of 6 March 2003, which was organized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, in close cooperation with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in Vienna from 11 to 12 March 2004. The Terrorism Prevention Branch has also participated in meetings held by the IAEA and OPCW and has met with representatives of these two organizations with a view to possible future joint activities.

The Branch also provides legal advisory services to requesting Member States for the ratification and implementation of the 12 universal instruments related to the prevention and suppression of international terrorism, including the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In this regard, in the past 17 months, the Branch has provided country-specific direct assistance to 39 countries, reaching

out to over 80 requesting countries, including through the organization of subregional workshops. If, during the course of providing such assistance, a country requests further information on matters pertaining to nuclear or chemical weapons, the Branch then forwards this request to the IAEA or the OPCW, respectively.

While the Office's Crime Programme does have primary responsibility for the ratification and implementation of the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (General Assembly resolution 55/255), the Protocol does not include weapons of mass destruction.

World Customs Organization

[Original: English]
[26 May 2004]

The World Customs Organization (WCO) is an intergovernmental body representing 162 customs administrations worldwide. Its mission is to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of customs administrations. Traditional customs functions have been the collection of duties and taxes. However, in addition to this important function, customs administrations have seen their responsibilities increase to include the protection of society.

The use of weapons of mass destruction and the proliferation of cross-border crime constitute major risks for the entire international trade community. In response to the increased terrorism threat, the WCO Council adopted the resolution on Security and facilitation of the international trade supply chain in June of 2002. The aim of the resolution was to enhance the effectiveness of customs controls without impeding the free flow of legitimate trade. An international Task Force, composed of customs experts, relevant international organizations and trading partner organizations was given responsibility for developing common solutions.

The approach of the WCO and the Task Force to fighting terrorism was in line with the March 2003 recommendations of the Counter-Terrorism Committee:

- Information — the sharing of data and best practices relevant to global cooperation
- Complementarity — focusing on what we do best, avoiding duplication of effort and waste of resources
- Independent effort — pursuing our mandates and initiatives with greater urgency
- Political momentum — ensuring that counter-terrorism is given a high priority by member Governments.

The Task Force produced a number of measures, instruments and guidelines, adopted by the WCO Council in June 2003. The most important achievements are:

- A new International Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters (Johannesburg Convention), which provides customs a legal basis to exchange information on high-risk consignments in advance of their arrival;

- Guidelines on Advance Passenger Information;
- Supply chain management guidelines describing the procedure for processing and exchanging information in advance of arrival of the goods;
- A revised version of the WCO data model (electronic customs declaration and cargo reporting message);
- A list of 27 key data elements required for the identification of high-risk consignments (incorporated into the data model);
- Guidelines for the development of national laws for the collection and submission of customs information taking into account data protection and data security;
- Guidelines for cooperation between customs and business;
- A capacity-building strategy and diagnostic framework;
- An Internet-based databank on new technology, available on the Organization's public and members' web site designed to give guidance on specialized equipment for enforcement purposes.

Effective border management is an integral part of the fight against terrorism and other crimes. Risk management and risk assessment are therefore the appropriate instruments to prioritize customs activities. The availability of information, its collection, processing and exchange in a timely manner become the key issues. To enhance border controls all border agencies have to base the assessment of risks on all available information including the pre-screening of goods and travellers.

In effect, the methodology of submitting information at the earliest possible stage will allow Governments to have access to an early warning system to protect their borders against dangerous or harmful cargo arriving, departing or moving through their territories. It also provides enhanced opportunities to authorize trustworthy traders, where assurance of security provisions can be provided, and this in turn will allow a greater degree of trade facilitation, leading to a better trading situation for member countries.

The relevance of WCO security and facilitation initiatives to United Nations Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1456 (2003)

The measures which have been developed so far have the potential to contribute towards the early warning mechanisms that are described in the United Nations Security Council resolutions. The WCO Advance Passenger Information recommendation and guidelines, which have been endorsed by the relevant intergovernmental and industry bodies (ICAO, IATA), provide a good practical example of the contribution of customs agencies towards the early identification of high-risk passengers.

Customs administrations have an important role to play in preventing the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction or their precursors. Resolution 1373 (2001) remarks on the close connection between terrorism and other forms of organized crime, including illicit drug and arms trafficking, money-laundering, the illegal movement of nuclear, chemical and biological materials and the need to strengthen cooperation at all levels. Delegates at relevant WCO Enforcement

Committee meetings considered that many types of transnational organized crime could be used to fund terrorism. The WCO is therefore developing best practices in the field of anti-money-laundering.

United Nations Security Council resolution 1456 (2003) emphasizes the growing danger of terrorist access to and use of nuclear, chemical, biological and other potentially deadly materials and the consequent need to strengthen controls on these materials. In the future customs should receive advance electronic information on the international movement of such commodities, which has the potential to become a valuable aspect of early warning mechanisms for detecting the movement of dangerous goods.

The WCO and customs administrations recognize the need for improved inter-agency partnership on these issues. The WCO has therefore increased cooperative efforts with other international organizations concerned with illicit use of or trafficking in chemical, biological and nuclear materials. We have participated in relevant international seminars, making presentations on our work in securing the international trade supply chain. These activities include:

- The WCO and the IAEA are developing a training course for customs officers on the control of radiation sources. The WCO is also cooperating with the IAEA in improving States' capabilities to detect and respond to the illicit traffic in nuclear materials, developing recommendations and guidelines for functional specifications covering a full range of border monitoring systems, including fixed installed monitors, multi-purpose hand-held isotope identifiers and pocket-type personal radiation monitors.

- The WCO is working on a project with the IAEA, Interpol and the United States Department of Energy to compare/share nuclear and radiological trafficking data for analysis and risk assessment. Preventing the misuse of radiological materials in making a so-called dirty bomb is a major aim of this project.

- In April 2004 the WCO participated in the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe meeting on the monitoring of radiologically contaminated scrap metal. The WCO presentation outlined our work on securing the trade supply chain and safeguarding radiological materials.

- In the area of chemical weapons, the WCO has increased cooperation with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). In September 2003, the WCO made a presentation at the OPCW Technical Meeting of National Authorities on Practical Aspects of the Transfers Regime in Terms of the Current Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention — Free Zones and Free Ports in Barcelona, Spain.

- As regards biological weapons, the WCO participated in an Interpol-sponsored workshop entitled "Preventing Disease Weaponization: Strengthening Law Enforcement and National Legislation" in Geneva in April 2003. In April 2004, the WCO made a presentation at the United States Department of State workshop entitled "Preventing Bio-Terrorism — International Dimensions".

- In May 2004 we met with Interpol to specifically discuss anti-terrorism measures and how our two organizations could share information and work together.

- Ambassador Arias, Chairman of the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee visited WCO in November 2003, coinciding with a meeting of the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), which was hosted by WCO. The objective of the meeting was to discuss a joint UNICRI/Europol project involving all the key international bodies, on the subject of weapons of mass destruction in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In attendance were officials of UNICRI, Europol, IAEA, OPCW, WHO, WCO and United Nations Counter-Terrorism Committee experts. A follow-up meeting was held in The Hague in May 2004 to discuss a planned workshop at the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative Center in Bucharest.